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The Role of Health in Labor  
and Marriage Markets 
Vincent Pohl
Health plays an important role in labor markets for several 
reasons. First, physical health is a component of human 
capital. Better health leads to more available time for labor 
market activity, but better health may also increase wages, 
as healthier individuals are more productive. On the other 
hand, labor market activity affects health. Besides the direct 
effect of working, for example, in an adverse environment, 
institutional factors also play a role. In particular, private 
health insurance in the United States is tied to employment. 
Therefore, individuals have an incentive to work for an 
employer that provides them with health benefits, although 
they may be a better match with another employer that does 
not provide health insurance. 
The relationship between labor supply and public health 
insurance is less obvious but nevertheless important. Since 
Medicaid eligibility depends on income, individuals have an 
incentive to decrease their labor supply in order to qualify 
for this public health insurance benefit. This effect matters 
especially for individuals who do not receive private health 
insurance through their employers. Since jobs with higher 
wages are more likely to provide health benefits, there is 
a range in the middle of the earnings distribution where 
individuals earn too much to be eligible for Medicaid, but do 
not receive employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI). In 
this setting, the recent U.S. health care reform, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), has signifi-
cant potential effects on labor supply. Both the expansion of 
Medicaid eligibility thresholds and the introduction of health 
insurance subsidies serve to fill the gap that currently exists 
between Medicaid and ESHI. The changes enacted by this 
reform imply that individuals can choose their labor supply 
without necessarily considering if they can obtain public or 
private health insurance. This can potentially lead to higher 
earnings and increased productivity. If individuals do not 
have to work full time in order to obtain ESHI, however, this 
reform may also decrease labor supply. In the first two chap-
ters of my dissertation, I analyze the effect of the PPACA on 
the labor supply of a group that can particularly benefit from 
this reform—single mothers. 
Health plays an important role not only in the labor mar-
ket but also in the marriage market. As in the labor market, 
the relationship between health and individual behavior is 
complex. For example, being married may improve one’s 
health because of financial and emotional support. On the 
other hand, being healthy may improve one’s prospects on 
the marriage market. In the third chapter of my dissertation, I 
focus on the latter effect and study whether individuals invest 
in their health by improving their health-related behavior 
(such as exercising or quitting smoking) in order to attract a 
spouse. 
Chapter 1
Medicaid and the Labor Supply of Single 
Mothers: Implications for Health Care Reform 
The PPACA has the potential to significantly affect 
employment among the low-wage population. On the one 
hand, increased Medicaid eligibility and newly established 
health insurance subsidies will reduce the incentive to seek 
health insurance through employment. On the other hand, 
expanding the income cutoffs for eligibility will remove 
work disincentives for individuals who currently refrain from 
working because they are afraid to lose Medicaid eligibility. 
The effects of this law on work incentives for those margin-
ally attached to the workforce are therefore ambiguous. At 
the same time, this population is important to policymakers 
because of its vulnerability and relative deprivation. 
In this chapter, I aim to determine the work incentive 
effects of the PPACA provisions that apply specifically to 
single mothers, a group that is characterized by low attach-
ment to the labor force and that will be particularly affected 
by these reforms. Single mothers and their children are also 
the main beneficiaries of Medicaid. In contrast to married 
women, they do not have the option to obtain health insur-
ance coverage through the employers of their spouses. 
Moreover, they often lack the qualifications necessary to find 
a job with ESHI. 
I estimate a structural model of labor supply that incor-
porates Medicaid and ESHI. In estimating the model, I rely 
on exogenous variation from recent expansions in Medic-
aid eligibility. After obtaining estimates of the preference 
parameters governing employment choice, I use them to 
simulate single mothers’ labor supply and take-up of ESHI 
under health care reform. The structural approach allows me 
to analyze the effects of health insurance subsidies, a policy 
that has not yet been introduced at the national level. 
My contributions in this chapter are fourfold. First, I 
model and estimate the joint impact of Medicaid and ESHI 
on single mothers’ labor supply. Potential ESHI coverage can 
affect the direction of the effect of Medicaid on employment. 
On the one hand, many low-income individuals are not quali-
fied enough for jobs that provide health benefits. Moreover, 
they are only eligible for Medicaid if their incomes fall 
below the applicable threshold. This induces work disincen-
tives. Expanding Medicaid eligibility or introducing health 
insurance subsidies would therefore relax this constraint and 
potentially increase labor supply. On the other hand, if the 
income threshold increases sufficiently, full-time workers 
with ESHI coverage may become eligible for Medicaid or 
subsidies. Since Medicaid and subsidized health insurance 
are cheaper and may be more generous than ESHI, these 
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workers may drop ESHI coverage (crowding-out of ESHI) 
and potentially reduce their labor supply. 
Second, I distinguish between full-time and part-time 
employment. The literature typically considers only the 
participation decision. As argued above, workers with low 
initial labor supply might increase their labor supply when 
the Medicaid eligibility threshold increases. Others might 
work full-time prior to health care reform in order to qualify 
for ESHI coverage. Introducing health insurance subsidies 
allows these individuals to reduce their labor supply and 
drop ESHI coverage while obtaining subsidized health insur-
ance. Therefore, not allowing for an intensive margin would 
mask these changes in labor supply. 
Third, I allow individual differences in the valuation of 
health insurance to affect the labor supply effects of Med-
icaid expansions. When analyzing the effects of Medicaid 
expansions on labor supply, it is important to account for 
individuals’ valuation of health insurance, which in turn 
depends on their health status. For example, a healthy person 
might change her behavior less in response to Medicaid 
expansions than someone with chronic medical conditions 
that require expensive health care. Specifically, I allow for 
health-related heterogeneity in medical expenditure and 
preferences over health insurance coverage. 
Fourth, the exogenous variation used to identify the 
impact of Medicaid expansions on labor supply comes from 
changes in Medicaid policies after the 1996 welfare reforms. 
These reforms affected mostly parents instead of children 
who benefited from earlier expansions. Since the recent 
health care reform extends Medicaid eligibility to even 
broader groups, the analysis of the more current Medicaid 
expansions is of particular policy interest. Moreover, some 
states implemented Medicaid thresholds that are close to the 
one specified by PPACA, which allows for more realistic 
policy simulations. 
I specify a discrete static labor supply model. Single 
mothers maximize their utility, which is derived from con-
sumption, leisure, and own and children’s health insurance 
coverage subject to a budget constraint that incorporates 
out-of-pocket medical expenditure and government transfers. 
The possible choices are nonwork, part-time without ESHI, 
full-time work without ESHI, and full-time work with ESHI. 
Depending on earnings and state- and year-specific Medicaid 
thresholds, single mothers and their children are eligible for 
Medicaid. 
To estimate the choice model, I develop a two-stage esti-
mator. In the first stage, I estimate a wage equation and two 
medical expenditure equations for mothers and children. The 
goal is to obtain conditional distributions of the utility func-
tion arguments. The wage regression accounts for selection 
into the labor force and into jobs with or without ESHI using 
a bivariate selection correction mechanism. Both the wage 
and medical expenditure regressions are estimated allowing 
for random individual effects, thus taking advantage of the 
panel structure in my data. In the second stage, I estimate 
the parameters of the utility function using draws from the 
conditional distributions of earnings and medical expendi-
tures as regressors. I allow both observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity in the utility parameters. The unobserved 
heterogeneity is modeled as a multivariate normal distribu-
tion. Hence, I use a multinomial logit model with choice 
probabilities that are integrated over the normal distribution. 
To estimate the parameters of this distribution and the fixed 
preference parameters, I use maximum simulated likelihood. 
Standard errors are block-bootstrapped over the two stages of 
the estimator. 
Individual data come from the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS) from 1996 to 2008. The MEPS is the ideal 
data set for the question at hand since it combines detailed 
information in health insurance coverage and medical expen-
ditures with labor market variables. The medical expenditure 
data are very reliable since individuals’ responses have been 
cross-checked with medical providers. Moreover, the MEPS 
provides a panel, albeit a short one, so I can account for indi-
vidual effects in my two-stage estimator. I use a restricted 
version of the MEPS, which allows me to match individual 
data with state- and year-specific policy variables such as 
Medicaid thresholds and welfare rules. 
The estimated preference parameters indicate that single 
mothers with medical conditions are significantly more likely 
not to work in order to be eligible for Medicaid or to work 
full-time with ESHI. This result implies that women who 
need health insurance most avoid the gap between Medicaid 
and ESHI where they would be uninsured. It is likely that 
these women would otherwise choose a different location on 
the hours distribution to increase their productivity or have 
more time for leisure or child care. Hence, these women 
benefit particularly from PPACA since it allows them to enter 
the labor force and to work in jobs without ESHI coverage. 
Based on these estimates, I simulate single mothers’ 
labor supply choices. First, I check the results by simulating 
labor supply under current Medicaid rules. The simulated 
choice probabilities match the observed ones closely, thereby 
providing evidence that the model is valid. Then I simulate 
labor supply under two policy counterfactuals: expansion of 
Medicaid only and both expansion of Medicaid and intro-
duction of health insurance subsidies. While the PPACA 
corresponds to the latter simulation, it is important to analyze 
how the components of this reform affect labor supply 
decisions independently. The simulation results show that 
health care reform increases labor force participation among 
single mothers by about 6 percent. Moreover, labor supply 
at the intensive margin grows by about 5 percent. Finally, 
health care reform leads to crowding-out of ESHI of about 
40 percent in this population. These results are heteroge-
neous across subgroups, however, with single mothers with 
medical conditions reacting most strongly to the reform, as 
expected based on the preference parameter estimates. I also 
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use these simulations to estimate the welfare implications of 
this reform. In particular, I calculate the compensating varia-
tion of this reform, that is, the dollar amount a single mother 
would be willing to forgo in order to obtain the reform. On 
average, this amount is about three times larger than the per-
family increase in public expenditures, where the increase 
comes mostly from the new health insurance subsidies. 
Hence, I conclude that this reform is welfare improving. 
Chapter 2
The Effect of Recent Medicaid Expansions on 
the Labor Supply of Single Mothers 
One drawback of the structural approach in the first chap-
ter is the functional and distributional assumptions necessary 
to estimate policy-invariant preference parameters. They are 
needed to simulate labor supply under a reform that is not yet 
observed, but it is difficult to test directly if these assump-
tions are valid. To check the robustness of my simulation 
results in Chapter 1, I perform reduced-form regressions of 
single mothers’ labor supply on Medicaid eligibility. Exog-
enous variation comes again from recent expansions in Med-
icaid thresholds for parents. Instead of estimating the effect 
of the PPACA, which would require more structure, I simply 
estimate the effect of existing Medicaid reforms. I can then 
compare these estimation results to the policy counterfactual 
I perform in Chapter 1 that only includes Medicaid expan-
sions but no health insurance subsidies. Besides providing 
a robustness check for the results in Chapter 1, this chapter 
is also of broader interest in its own right. No study exists 
to date that analyzes the overall effect of recent Medicaid 
expansions on labor supply, and this chapter fills this gap in 
the literature. 
Since Medicaid eligibility depends on earnings, which in 
turn are determined by labor supply, simply regressing labor 
supply on Medicaid coverage or eligibility yields inconsis-
tent estimates due to endogeneity of the Medicaid eligibility 
variable. In order to avoid this problem, I use two different 
identification strategies. First, I use Medicaid and Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) income eligibility thresh-
olds as instruments for Medicaid and CHIP coverage. To the 
extent that these thresholds are exogenous, they are valid 
instruments. As with all public policies, there is a concern 
that policymakers choose Medicaid thresholds in response to 
individual behavior, rendering these thresholds endogenous. 
In this case, however, it is plausible that policymakers do not 
react to single mothers’ labor supply when choosing Med-
icaid thresholds. Medicaid is a program intended to provide 
health insurance coverage to low-income families, but not as 
a labor market program. 
Second, I use a triple-differences strategy by compar-
ing labor market outcomes across states, over time, and 
between single mothers and childless single women. This 
identification strategy does not require exogeneity of 
Medicaid thresholds with respect to single women’s labor 
supply. Hence, it is valid even if the exogeneity assumption 
described above fails. Instead, it relies on the assumption that 
variation in labor supply across single mothers and childless 
single women is independent of Medicaid thresholds when 
controlling for state and year fixed effects. Childless single 
women constitute an ideal control group since they face a 
similar labor market environment as single mothers, but they 
are never eligible for Medicaid. Under current policies, only 
parents of Medicaid-eligible children qualify for this benefit. 
Since Medicaid coverage is identically equal to zero for 
childless women, I cannot use it as the explanatory variable. 
Instead, I simulate Medicaid eligibility by state, year, and 
demographic group, and use this simulated measure inter-
acted with an indicator for the presence of children as the 
regressor of interest. 
A second contribution of this chapter is the analysis of 
migration patterns between states in response to changes 
in Medicaid thresholds. An important concern when using 
cross-state variation in policies is potential migration in 
response to these policies. If single mothers select their 
location based on Medicaid generosity, for example, the 
identifying assumption that Medicaid eligibility thresholds 
are exogenous would be invalid. To test if migration because 
of differences in Medicaid generosity is a problem in this 
context, I compare year-to-year changes in Medicaid thresh-
olds of single mothers and childless single women who did 
or did not migrate between states. Again, childless women 
are an ideal comparison group since they are never eligible 
for Medicaid and therefore have no incentive to migrate 
because of differences between these policies. Otherwise, 
the incentives for single women with and without children to 
move between states should be similar because of cross-state 
differences in labor markets. Therefore, we expect to see no 
systematic difference in migration patterns between these 
two groups in response to Medicaid threshold changes. 
Using a large sample of single women with and without 
children from the March CPS from 1996 to 2007, I first 
provide extensive descriptive evidence on the effect of 
Medicaid expansions on single mothers’ labor supply. This 
mostly graphical suggests that single mothers adjust their 
labor supply in response to the incentives that are implied by 
Medicaid income tests. Overall, expanded Medicaid thresh-
olds have a negative effect on labor supply. This adjustment 
mostly occurs at the extensive margin, but to some extent 
single mothers also reduce hours worked in order to qualify 
for Medicaid. 
In the main estimation results both identification strategies 
yield the same result that expansions in Medicaid eligibil-
ity do not decrease labor supply. I use various measures of 
labor supply for both the extensive and intensive margins, 
including labor force participation, full-time versus part-time 
work, weeks worked per year, and hours worked per week. 
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The results for all outcomes are consistent in showing that 
an increase in Medicaid eligibility thresholds does not have a 
negative effect on labor supply. 
To test if single mothers migrate between states in order 
to benefit from more generous Medicaid policies, I use CPS 
data on the state of residence in the previous year. This 
allows me to compare migration of single women with and 
without children in a difference-in-differences framework 
when the destination state has a different Medicaid thresh-
old from the initial state. There is no systematic difference 
between these groups when comparing the unconditional 
distributions of differences in Medicaid thresholds pre- and 
postmigration. Hence, I conclude that single mothers do not 
choose their locations based on Medicaid thresholds. 
In summary, this chapter provides evidence that the 
structural assumptions in Chapter 1 are valid since I obtain 
qualitatively similar results. Medicaid expansions alone have 
moderately negative effects on single mothers’ labor supply. 
This result is of interest to policymakers since it shows that 
the health insurance subsidies in PPACA are necessary to 
avoid decreases in labor supply in this population. More-
over, I show that migration in response to Medicaid thresh-
olds does not bias the estimation results. This conclusion is 
important since it backs an important assumption when using 
policy variation across states. It also shows that Medicaid 
policies do not impact individual behavior enough to cause 
location changes. 
Chapter 3
The Marriage Market Ratio and Investment  
in Health 
Health also plays an important role in the marriage mar-
ket: healthy individuals may be more likely to get married 
or find a more desirable spouse. Therefore, individuals can 
affect their marriage market outcomes by improving their 
health. This is the topic of the third chapter: I test whether 
individuals invest more in their health when it is harder to 
find a spouse. Sociologists and researchers in public health 
have long recognized the relationship between marriage and 
health. The correlation between marital status and health is 
often given a causal interpretation termed marital	protection. 
However, most existing studies merely uncover a correlation 
between marital status and good health or lower mortality. 
Causal effects are difficult to determine because individu-
als select into marriage. The effect of marriage on health 
decreases when marital selection is accounted for, but the 
positive correlation persists. Therefore, the consensus is that 
both selection and a causal protective effect of marriage on 
health matter. 
If being married improves one’s health and people sort 
into marriage based on their premarital health status, an 
interesting question arises: To what extent do people decide 
to improve their health in order to attract a potential spouse 
and to increase the likelihood of marriage? The third chapter 
attempts to answer this question. Depending on the result, 
this has important implications for the findings of the exist-
ing literature claiming the presence of a causal protective 
effect of marriage on health. If individuals improve their 
health in order to get married, any positive correlation 
between marital status and health is confounded by preexist-
ing health status. This effect is not necessarily the same as 
marital selection because the decision to be healthy is made 
consciously to attract a potential spouse. 
To formalize the relationship between marriage market 
conditions and health investment, I develop a simple model 
of premarital health behaviors. Intuitively, the incentive to 
invest in one’s health in order to attract a potential spouse is 
highest when it is not certain to find a spouse, but the prob-
ability is sufficiently high. Once it becomes very unlikely to 
find a spouse, the cost of investing in one’s health outweighs 
the (uncertain) benefit of marriage. On the other hand, when 
marriage is certain, the incentive for health investments 
is smaller because it is more likely to find a spouse in any 
case. The likelihood to become married, in turn, depends on 
the relative numbers of men and women. Hence, the model 
predicts that the relationship between the relative numbers of 
individuals of own and opposite sexes and healthy behavior 
has an inverted U-shape. 
A simple way to capture relative numbers of men and 
women on the marriage market is to use sex ratios, which are 
defined by the ratio of men to women at marriageable ages. 
Instead of simply using the ratio of cohort sizes, I develop a 
marriage market ratio that explicitly accounts for the empiri-
cal distribution of age differences between married men 
and women. A novel contribution is to distinguish between 
different racial compositions of couples. For example, the 
distribution of age differences among mixed-race couples 
exhibits a larger variance than that of same-race couples. 
My marriage market ratio accounts for these differences and 
therefore correctly reflects the marriage market conditions of 
black women, for example, who have the option to marry a 
black or a white man of different ages. 
Using data from the National Health Interview Survey and 
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, I test the 
hypothesis that the marriage market ratio affects the health-
related behaviors of smoking, drinking, and exercising. The 
results indicate that men and women of all races are less 
likely to smoke and black men and women are less likely to 
drink when facing unfavorable marriage market conditions. 
The results for physical activity, however, are mixed.
